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ABSTRACT
Devices connected to the Internet today have a wide range
of local communication channels available, such as wire-
less Wifi, Bluetooth or NFC, as well as wired backhaul. In
densely populated areas it is possible to create heteroge-
neous, multihop communication paths using a combination
of these technologies, and often transmit data with lower la-
tency than via a wired Internet connection. However, the
potential for sharing meshed wireless radios in this way has
never been realised due to the lack of economic incentives to
do so on the part of individual nodes.
In this paper, we explore how virtual currencies might be
used to provide an end-to-end incentive scheme to convince
forwarding nodes that it is profitable to send messages on
via the lowest latency mechanism available. Clients inject a
small amount of money to transmit a message, and forward-
ing engines compete to solve a time-locked puzzle that can
be claimed by the node that delivers the result in the lowest
latency. Our approach naturally extends congestion control
techniques to a surge pricing model when available band-
width is low and does not require latency measurements.
1. INTRODUCTION
Devices connected to the Internet today have a wide
range of local communication channels available. For
example, most new wifi-routers and access points have
two or more radios (one for 2.4 GHz and one for 5GHz
communication). Connected to each access point there
are clients with several radio technologies available, such
as Bluetooth and NFC. Other physical communication
channels also exist, for example LEDs, cameras [14] and
microphones [10] depending on available hardware.
In urban areas it is possible to create heterogeneous,
multihop communication paths using these technolo-
gies. As radio waves propagate at the speed of light,
these paths offer lower-latency communication. How-
ever, there are few economic incentives for edge nodes
to act as low-latency data forwarders, and the disincen-
tive of wasting their batteries on other nodes’ traffic.
As an example of how wireless edge nodes can be used
for faster forwarding, consider a user A who wants to
send messages to user B a few kilometers away, as illus-
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Figure 1: ISP and edge forwarding paths between nodes
A and B
trated in Figure 1. Using a traditional forwarding path
the messages may first have to be delivered through the
core network of A’s ISP (or mobile operator), then be
forwarded to the core network of B’s ISP, before finally
being delivered to user B. The forwarding latency in
this example depends on the number of hops and dis-
tance to travel via the core networks of the ISPs, not
the geographical distance between the nodes. As a re-
sult, nodes A and B may experience the same latency
whether the geographical distance between them is one
or tens of kilometers.
An alternative forwarding path could be established
as a wireless path through intermediate radio devices
between A and B, such as node C in Figure 1. This
forwarding path could potentially achieve significantly
lower latency than traditional methods, as well as being
resilient to wide-area networking failures since it only
depends on the local communications network. There
are however few devices today that are willing or able
to participate in the network as low-latency edge for-
warders. We argue that the primary reason for this is
not technical, but caused by lack of incentives compared
to the increased workload and need for investment in the
edge nodes. For example, it is not uncommon for edge
nodes to participate as forwarders in city-wide mesh
networks due to bad or expensive Internet connectiv-
ity, as in Athens [1], or to act as forwarders to improve
communication during a political crisis. Examples of
the latter are the Occupy Wall Street movement mesh
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network [9] and the Open Mesh Project in Egypt [2].
In these cases the incentives caused by external factors
outweigh the forwarding cost.
The perceived cost of forwarding a message depends
on the workload imposed on the edge node. Depending
on the technology, this workload may be low (forward on
regular Wifi), but one could imagine higher workloads –
such as for a mobile phone that has to turn on Bluetooth
discovery for long time periods. The owner of the node
may also have to install custom software or invest in
upgraded hardware to forward messages faster. Other
factors, such as power consumption may also play an
important role.
A forwarding incentive can be created by simply of-
fering payment to the forwarders, for example by using
a decentralized virtual currency like Bitcoin [13]. A
useful feature of many virtual currencies is that micro-
payments can be issued with minimal transaction costs
and without relying on a centralized authority. It is
more difficult to create a payment system with incen-
tives for minimizing latency, since it is difficult to mea-
sure latency objectively in a way that can be accepted
by all nodes. For example, the latency observed by the
sender, a forwarder and the final recipient may not be
the same, and all parties have economic incentives to
under- or overreport the latency.
In this paper we present Kadupul, a system that in-
centivises low-latency forwarding between edge nodes
without relying on latency measurements. This is ac-
complished by creating a reward system based on time-
locked puzzles [12]. Time-locked puzzles [3] can be used
to hide information until the puzzle is solved or the
solution is provided by the creator or a third-party. Re-
cently, a time-locked puzzle based on Bitcoin was pro-
posed and implemented [16], which allows Bitcoin re-
wards to be locked for a given time period and be col-
lected by the first node that solves the puzzle (or is told
the solution).
We build on Todd’s time-lock puzzle mechanism [16]
to propose a forwarding model for rewarding forwarders
by giving them an advantage in solving a puzzle. A for-
warder can collect a reward if it provides the correct
solution to a puzzle protecting it. Each forwarder is
provided with a solution to a reward after it has for-
warded a message. The catch is that each puzzle is
public and solvable by anyone after a known amount of
time. This creates a race to forward the message before
the puzzle has been solved by other nodes.
The main contribution of this paper is a new for-
warding model that creates incentives for low-latency
forwarding without having to measure the latency. Eco-
nomic incentives for optimizing other parameters in ad-
hoc networks, such as bandwidth or power, have been
proposed in earlier works (see e.g. [7]).
Note that although this paper primarily discusses Bit-
coin as a reward system, the ideas described here can
be used with other virtual currencies as well, as long as
they provide a similar underlying P2P protocol.
We will now describe the basic mechanisms in Kadupul
and propose several forwarding models based on time
locked puzzles as incentives (§2). We then discuss fu-
ture directions and conclude the paper (§3).
2. DESIGN
We describe the core functionality of Kadupul by first
discussing how the forwarding paths are established and
negotiated. We then describe in detail how time locked
puzzles can be used as a low-latency forwarding incen-
tive and propose several forwarding models based on
the mechanism.
We assume that most of the nodes that participate
as forwarders in Kadupul rarely change their geograph-
ical location (although they can). This means that al-
though nodes may be anonymous as users of the virtual
currency, they will over time be able to gather informa-
tion about other radio nodes in their region. Kadupul
nodes may use this to estimate risk by observing the
behaviour and reliability of nodes they cooperate with
over time.
A message forwarded by Kadupul can be of any size.
For example, a high quality video can be transferred as
a single message.
2.1 Establishing forwarding paths
Some coordination must be performed in advance to
form heterogeneous multihop communication paths. The
forwarders along the path may be able to discover each
other directly using radio or other techniques, but if
a wide range of technologies are being used over large
geographical areas this may not always be possible.
In the following we provide an example of how a for-
warding path may be set up with the help of a decen-
tralized P2P network on the Internet.
We assume that in most cases the forwarding path is
established by the sender. This requires an initial dis-
covery step where the sender finds potential forwarders
that together can forward information from the sender
to the receiver. Potential forwarders can for example
be discovered based on their location and local com-
munication range, using a decentralized, Internet-based
P2P network, such as proposed in for example [15] or
[11]. Using the protocol proposed in [15], the sender
can search for other nodes that are able to transmit to
nodes in a given geographical region.
When a potential forwarder is found, the sender con-
tacts the node directly over the Internet and requests a
forwarding quote. If the price and capabilities of the for-
warder is acceptable, the sender attempts to find other
nodes that are able to receive the message when it is for-
warded. The process is repeated with these nodes. If
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no recipients are found (or the prices are unacceptable),
the sender must find a different forwarder.
Note that a forwarder may have different radio tech-
nologies available, be able to transfer on different fre-
quencies and at different power levels. Each configura-
tion may have a different expected forwarding latency
and price.
2.2 Time-locked forwarding rewards
After establishing the forwarding path, the sender
must publish a set of rewards. We now describe the
mechanism and protocol used to publish, as well as col-
lect rewards for the forwarding nodes in more detail.
Todd proposes an interesting scheme for implement-
ing time-locked puzzles with Bitcoin rewards [16]. A
chain of rewards can be hidden in puzzles and pub-
lished. Each puzzle has a value in Bitcoins that can
be collected by any node that knows the solution to the
puzzle. The solution can either be provided or can be
calculated after a known amount of time. The puzzle
is constructed in such a way that it can be created in
parallel, but only solved in serial.
More specifically, the scheme from [16] uses multiple
rounds of a SHA256 [5] hash to calculate a Bitcoin se-
cret key from a randomly chosen initialization vector
for each block of the reward puzzle chain. If the reward
chain has for example 10 blocks, 10 initialization vec-
tors are chosen and SHA256 is executed iteratively on
each vector. Based on the result, a Bitcoin secret key
is generated, which in turn is used to generate a public
key and a Bitcoin address. The number of iterations
determines how long it will take to recover the key pair
if only the initialization vector is known. When the key
pair is found, the public key must be revealed to collect
the reward.
When the reward chain is made public, the initializa-
tion vector in each block (except the first) is obfuscated
by XORing it with the SHA256 of the public key of
the previous block. Thus, to decode a reward key pair
iteratively you would first need the public key used to
collect the reward from the previous block. This pre-
vents the puzzles from being solved in parallel, while
forcing reward collectors to reveal the missing piece of
information required to collect the next reward.
To estimate the time it takes to unlock the reward we
must assume a lower bound for how long it takes to per-
form the hash operation. As SHA256 is used to mine
Bitcoins there have for several years been strong eco-
nomic incentives to create faster hardware and software
solutions to calculate it. A list of known Bitcoin hard-
ware miners showing speeds in million double SHA256
hashes per second (Mhash/s) and power consumption
(MHash/J) is maintained online in [4]. For example,
the fastest ASIC-based device currently available can
calculate 5.500.000 Mhash/s at 1506 Mhash/J. How-
ever, these devices rely on parallel operations and can
not be used to crack a time-locked puzzle that must be
solved in serial. A more realistic lower bound is thus
similar to a very fast single core CPU or FPGA. The
lower bound can be adjusted over time if it is observed
in the block chain that a puzzle is broken faster than
intended.
This mechanism can be adapted to create forward-
ing incentives in several ways, and we discuss four such
forwarding models next. Note that control traffic (but
not the actual data) is transferred over a higher latency
control plane, which for example could be the Internet.
2.2.1 Double incentive forwarding
The objective in this model is to create a mechanism
that makes the forwarders lose their reward unless they
forward the message intact to the next hop as soon as
possible, but also to create an incentive for assisting
other forwarders. The full process is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2a gives an overview of the initial tasks that
must be performed before forwarding can begin. First,
the sender must find the forwarders and negotiate the
forwarding fees. The sender then generates and makes
public a chain of rewards using time-locked encryption.
For simplicity, we assume that one reward block is gen-
erated for each forwarder. The reward attached to each
block may differ in value depending on the terms that
were negotiated with the respective forwarder.
As shown in Figure 2b, the sender proceeds to send
two values to each forwarder. The first value is a secret
that enables the previous hop on the forwarding path
to retrieve its reward. The second value is a nonce that
when combined with a secret from the next hop on the
forwarding path, as well as the hash of the message,
results in the key required to unlock one of the rewards.
To avoid having to store the full message in each node,
the nodes may use a rolling hash function to hash the
message. The nodes then only need to maintain a buffer
that contains a window with enough information to cre-
ate the hash and to act as a message queue for forward-
ing.
Now the forwarding itself can begin, as shown in Fig-
ure 2c. The message is forwarded along the path and
acknowledged by the next hop by sending the secret
back to the forwarder. The acknowledgement address
in the control plane is also sent with the message - for
example an IP address and port number.
Figure 2d illustrates the reward collection process.
After a node has forwarded the full message and re-
ceived the required secret from the next node, it can
reconstruct the puzzle solution and collect a reward. A
forwarder will only be able to claim a reward when:
1. The previous node in the routing path was able
to claim their reward and thus revealed the public
key of the previous block
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Figure 2: Negotiation, forwarding and reward collection
with double incentive forwarding.
Radio / wireless
Internet
A DCB
P2P geoloc. Bitcoin P2P
2. Negotiate forwarding
1. Find forwarders 3. Publish time-lockedBitcoin rewards
(a) Sender prepares forwarding path
Radio / wireless
Internet
A DCB
P2P geoloc. Bitcoin P2P
C nonce
B secret
B nonce (C secret)
secret = solution ⨁ nonce ⨁ hash(message) ⨁ hash(prev. node solution)
(b) Sender distributes secrets and nonces
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(c) Sender sends message, nodes acknowledge with secrets
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2. B reward public
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(d) Forwarders reconstruct solutions and collect rewards
2. It has received the full message successfully so that
it can generate a hash
3. The next node in the path has revealed the neces-
sary secret generated by the sender, thus acknowl-
edging that the full message was forwarded.
If the receiver is untrusted, the sender may encrypt
the message with a key derived from the public key of
the final reward to make the message unreadable until
all forwarders have been rewarded.
This mechanism ensures that all nodes have incen-
tives both to forward the message to the next hop (to
obtain the missing secret to unlock the reward) and to
supply the previous hop with its secret (otherwise they
are unable to decode their own reward).
As the reward has a time-lock, the nodes are also
given an incentive to perform the forwarding as fast
as they can, or the encryption may be broken by other
nodes in the Bitcoin network trying to claim the reward
by brute forcing the keys. The node that can most effec-
tively balance high-throughput and low-enough latency
forwarding stands to profit most from solving the ma-
jority of puzzles it sees and claiming the rewards.
2.2.2 All or nothing
Note that in the forwarding model discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2.1, the identity of every forwarder must be re-
vealed to the next forwarder to allow the message to
be acknowledged with the correct secret. In a broad-
cast network this may not be necessary. For example, a
forwarder may be instructed to listen to a specific Wifi
channel in promiscuous mode to receive the message
and then just forward the message as it was received
over another broadcast link. It may not be possible for
the forwarders to reply with an acknowledgment in the
same way if it has a weaker radio than the previous hop.
It is possible to use an alternative acknowledgement
mechanism to avoid revealing the identity of the for-
warders. This forwarding scheme is shown in Figure
3 and assumes a forwarding mechanism that can hide
the Internet address of the forwarder, for example by
using anonymous broadcast [17]. Instead of distribut-
ing secrets in advance, the final receiver acknowledges
the receipt of the message to the sender and the sender
then unlocks the puzzles for all the forwarders. This
scheme requires more coordination between sender and
receiver, but makes it difficult for the forwarders to col-
lude. It also increases the forwarding risk as none of the
nodes will receive their reward if the message is lost or
delayed along the way, which may affect the forwarding
price.
This forwarding model can be useful in “off-the-grid”
mesh networks, where one of the goals is to avoid eaves-
dropping of traffic by global passive sniffing of conven-
tional networks.
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Figure 3: Broadcast forwarding without revealing for-
warder identity to other forwarders.
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2.2.3 Contract forwarding
Kadupul forwarding may also be used without estab-
lishing the forwarding path in advance. In this case the
sender negotiates a forwarding contract with another
node to bring the message to the recipient. It is then
up to the node that accepted the forwarding contract
to deliver the message as fast as possible. This node
may use any number of subcontractors for the message
to reach its final destination. This forwarding model is
potentially simpler to implement and use for the sender,
but the sender is no longer in control of the path the
message travels. It may also increase the forwarding
price as more work is left to the forwarders.
This forwarding model can especially be useful in
combination with the other forwarding models. For ex-
ample, a pull based delivery system can be constructed
by letting the recipient negotiate a contract with the
sender. When the contract has been accepted, the sender
uses another forwarding model to deliver the content to
the recipient.
2.2.4 Competing forwarders
The “all or nothing” model (§2.2.2) can be extended
to create a competition between forwarders along mul-
tiple paths. This can be accomplished by using Ran-
dom Linear Network Coding [8] (RLNC) or fountain
codes [6] to encode partial messages and then forward-
ing the messages along multiple paths at the same time.
RLNC and fountain codes are useful because the orig-
inal message can be reconstructed when enough coded
packets have been received. Fountain codes are end-
to-end, but RLNC also allows recoding at intermediate
nodes. When the recipient has received enough par-
tial messages to reconstruct the original message, re-
wards are distributed to the forwarders depending on
how much innovative information they forwarded.
This forwarding model can be especially useful for
transferring messages that should be distributed to mul-
tiple edge nodes in the same area, such as for multicas-
ting video streams.
2.2.5 Edge node caching
Kadupul naturally creates incentives for edge nodes
to cache content. If an edge node is able to store content
that is delivered frequently, it can volunteer to deliver
the full content during the negotiation process and col-
lect the full reward for the delivery. It would also be
able to deliver the content in much shorter time than
if it would have to be forwarded again, allowing it to
provide a better offer than its competitors. Since each
node must pay for its own cost of storing the cached
data in the hope of future requests, they also have an
incentive to develop efficient prediction and cache evic-
tion algorithms.
3. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a mechanism for creating an eco-
nomic incentive for low-latency data forwarding and de-
scribed how the mechanism can be useful for establish-
ing low-latency forwarding paths between edge nodes on
the Internet. The mechanism is decentralised and does
not require latency measurements. We have mainly fo-
cussed on edge networks in this paper, but the mecha-
nism can also be used in other types of networks where
low latency should be rewarded.
An advantage of Kadupul in edge networks is that
forwarding nodes have incentives to avoid congestion
and long processing delays. If an area is congested,
nodes that are able to forward with low latency would
be able to demand a higher price. This increased price
encourages central nodes to invest in special hardware
to reduce the congestion. Two nodes may for example
cooperate and set up long-range, point-to-point links
that increases hop length and reduces interference. Sim-
ilarly, nodes that are near a congested area, may set up
point-to-point links that forward data across the con-
gested area to a node on the other side. Commercial
operators may also take advantage of the system, for
example by selling low latency access using a privately
owned frequency range.
Although all of the pieces needed to implement this
type of forwarding exists today, some technical chal-
lenges remain before it can be fully realised.
For instance, it may take a long time to set up the
initial forwarding path because several potentially slow
tasks must be performed before forwarding can begin.
For example, the reward puzzles can be generated in
parallel, but may still be time consuming to produce if
the puzzle is to be protected over longer time periods.
In addition, if Bitcoin is used, transactions are relatively
slow and it takes a while to publish rewards. Similarly,
it may take some time for the forwarders to collect their
rewards after receiving the solution to the puzzle. These
delays require that additional time must be added to the
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puzzles to make sure that rewards do not expire until
the forwarders have been able to collect them. Today,
this makes the method mostly suitable for applications
that will use the path for longer time periods, such as
for large, planned data transfers.
However, we are confident that these delays will be-
come much smaller in the near future. As virtual cur-
rencies are becoming more popular, their protocols and
software implementations are constantly being optimized
to reduce delays. Furthermore, the number of reward
puzzles that can be generated in parallel can dramati-
cally increase if they are calculated using GPUs or FP-
GAs. Multiple rewards can be given to each hop while
still being required to be solved in serial, and so the
number of rewards created in parallel can exceed the
total number of hops.
Kadupul helps to balance the economic needs of ser-
vice providers and users to deliver a viable model for
deploying reliable multihop edge networks, as well as
enhancing the resilience of the global network by only
using local links when possible.
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